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Abstract 
 
This paper considers the status of economic reform in India, to understand which further 
reforms might be desirable, and why they have not been successfully introduced or 
implemented. Rather than provide a list of reforms that “should” be undertaken, the paper 
attempts to understand the political economy of the process of economic reform in India, 
and how that process plays out with respect to different sectors of the economy, or 
different areas of potential economic reform. The discussion includes the roles of 
institutions, interest groups and ideas in driving reform. 
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The Dynamics and Status of India’s Economic Reforms 
 
Nirvikar Singh, Department of Economics, University of California, Santa Cruz 
 
1. Introduction 
India is a large, heterogeneous and complex nation, with 1.2 billion people, and multiple 
ethnicities, languages and religions. Its size and diversity make it more like a continent 
than a single country. India stands out among developing countries in its political 
structures, having sustained a working democracy for almost six decades, even at 
relatively low levels of income. It also is distinguished by the richness and relative 
stability of its institutions (Kapur, 2005). These institutions have had an important impact 
on the evolution of India’s economy. 
 
As one of the first colonies to achieve independence in the 20th century, India was a 
pioneer among non-Western nations in trying to forge an explicit development strategy. 
The centerpiece of India’s development strategy was modernization through 
industrialization. Effort by private industrialists was viewed as inadequate for this task. 
Underlying this view was a realization that infrastructure has public good aspects that 
could lead to under provision if left entirely to the private sector.  Even non-infrastructure 
sectors such as steel, chemicals or machine tools may be subject to coordination or 
linkage issues that require a “big push,” further supporting a case for public intervention.1  
 
Thus, India’s leaders embarked on a program of government occupation of the 
“commanding heights” of the economy, including the creation of public enterprises in 
key sectors of the economy, regulation of existing private businesses, and some 
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nationalization. Analytical arguments for growth promotion were combined with 
concerns about inequalities that are inherent in capitalism, and more sociologically or 
philosophically based concerns about the role of business in society. This program was 
implemented, however, in the context of a pluralistic constitutional democracy with 
multiple tiers of government. 
 
The evolution of the pattern of state control of the market contributed to increasing 
problems in maintaining or accelerating economic growth, and eventually led to various 
attempts to reverse this pattern of control. The reversal in policy direction was given 
impetus by a balance of payments crisis in 1991, and has been known as “economic 
reform.”2 Key initial steps of reform were liberalization of international trade and 
investment, and of controls on the level and pattern of private domestic industrial 
investment and operations. Numerous other institutional reforms have followed, 
including the conduct of monetary policy, and the operation of financial markets. Other 
reforms have been more difficult to achieve, even when it seemed that a consensus had 
been built up.  
 
The goal of this paper is to consider the status of economic reform in India, to understand 
which further reforms might be desirable, and why they have not been successfully 
introduced or implemented. Rather than provide a list of reforms that “should” be 
undertaken, the attempt will be to understand the political economy of the process of 
economic reform in India, and how that process plays out with respect to different sectors 
of the economy, or different areas of potential economic reform. Some familiarity with 
 3
the Indian economy and polity will be assumed. In particular, the paper seeks to explain 
the dynamics of past and future reforms in terms of the nature of interest groups and their 
influence. It also highlights the role of ideas and individuals in the reform process: India 
has a process of debate and change implementation that is quite understandable. Several 
other themes also run through the paper: the difficulty of reforming governance, because 
of the reflexive nature of the exercise; the increasing alignment of government and 
business, making some reforms easier; and the inherent differences in difficulty of reform 
across different sectors or economic issues.  
 
Accordingly, Section 2 provides a conceptual framework, which is intertwined with some 
of the historical evolution of India’s economy. Sections 3-5 consider governance 
structures, taxes and public service delivery, which have encompassed some of the 
greatest change and also some of the greatest difficulties in change. Sections 6 through 9 
discuss issues of labor markets, privatization, corporate governance, competition policy, 
and bankruptcy laws. All of these together have important implications for the growth of 
the industrial sector, itself an important component of economic growth and 
development. Sections 10 and 11 consider agriculture and land markets, while Sections 
12 and 13 examine investment in physical infrastructure and human capital, the latter 
referring to the education sector, of course. Section 14 is a summary conclusion.  
 
Several of these issues, especially labor and education, are addressed in other pieces in 
this volume, but are treated here in the context of a particular view on the dynamics of 
reform. However, this paper does not tackle monetary and financial sector reforms or the 
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external sector, which are also covered elsewhere in this volume. These areas have 
actually seen the some of the most significant reforms, and a brief comment on the 
differences from other sectors will be offered in the conclusion 
 
2. History and Concepts 
Using the colonial period as a benchmark, India certainly did well after independence. Its 
GDP growth and improvements in human development indicators were both well above 
the earlier era. This progress was accompanied by the development of a rich set of 
governance and private sector institutions for delivering food, health, shelter and 
education to a much greater proportion of the population than ever before in the region’s 
history. Infrastructure investment was greater than before, industries were developed in 
support of modernization goals, and higher education, in particular, grew dramatically.3  
 
On the other hand, as early as the 1960s, several East Asian countries began to outstrip 
India’s economic performance, relying on export-led growth.4 However, in India this 
period was marked by political impulses that restrained economic policy changes that 
would have moved in this direction. By the 1980s, India’s relative lack of success became 
obvious, with the cumulative impacts of decades of higher growth in East and Southeast 
Asia. Along with the crisis, China’s embrace of capitalism, and its growth record helped 
favor economic reform. Nevertheless, the economic path of the previous decades created 
certain barriers to change. 
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India’s particular implementation of a strategy of state-led industrialization led to three 
related sets of problems (Singh, 2008). First, often the policy measures used in practice 
were inferior ways of achieving avowed goals, with over-reliance on quantitative and 
discretionary controls. Second, the system of discretionary bureaucratic control created 
classic ‘vested interests’ that prevented reform. Third, the short-run political logic of 
governing India led to transfers and subsidies that also created interest groups. The 
second and third of these factors continue to influence the path of economic reform in 
India. 
 
Once policies were in place that created distortions in markets through controls, there 
were beneficiaries of these distortions, through the economic rents created.5 Customs 
officers and income tax officials became notorious for extracting payments in return for 
ignoring punitive restrictions or tax rates, but all government bureaucrats were put in 
positions where they had the potential to profit from the lawful or unlawful exercise of 
their discretionary control. Politicians often became eager collaborators in, or drivers of 
this process, to claim their share of the rents. Policy restrictions and entry barriers also 
created rents for private economic actors such as industrial license holders, middlemen in 
agricultural markets, and import license holders. These groups also developed interests in 
preserving the status quo. Indeed, there was a long period in which economic controls 
steadily increased, as more and more groups and organizations sought to create rent-
seeking opportunities. 
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India’s size and diversity required considerable attention to creating winning political 
coalitions. A system in which the government occupied the commanding heights became 
a natural tool for seeking political advantage through the spread of all kinds of subsidies, 
especially to numerically important rural voters. The nationalization of banks in 1969 
was designed to create a populist image and electoral appeal for then-Prime Minister 
Indira Gandhi as she sought to consolidate political power. These exercises in 
competitive populism were driven not by economic logic, however imperfectly applied, 
but by political imperatives. Once new beneficiaries of transfers or subsidies were 
created, they became interest groups protecting those economic rents. 
 
The general idea that interest groups affect resource allocation and block reform is a well-
worn one. Murphy, Shleifer and Vishny (1993) provide theoretical reasons why rent-
seeking is particularly costly for growth. Rajan and Zingales (2006) model the primacy of 
interest groups over institutions in acting as a barrier to reform.6 Bardhan (1984) 
provided a class-based analysis of a politico-economic equilibrium with “multiple 
vetoes,” to explain India’s slow growth.7 It has also been suggested, by political 
scientists, that India’s economic reforms have been a project of the elite, not involving 
the masses, and therefore subject to being blocked in a mass democracy. The ironic te
“reform by stealth,” (Jenkins, 1999) used to describe India’s process of economic ref
has a similar conceptual flavor. Economists (Rao and Singh, 2005; Singh and Srinivasan, 
2005) and political scientists (Saez, 2002; Sinha, 2005) have emphasized India’s reg
politics and federal governance structures. All of these perspectives can be useful in 
understanding why welfare-improving reforms may be difficult to undertake or complete. 
rm 
orm, 
ional 
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Interest groups and institutions are amenable to formal modeling, and provide a standard 
conceptual framework in examining the status and dynamics of India’s economic 
reforms. It is harder to pin down the role of ideas. The introduction mentioned the role of 
East Asia, and particularly of China, as a benchmark for Indian thinking on economic 
policy.8 Much earlier, the USSR’s experience, as then understood, was a source of ideas 
for economic development policy. Academics have also shaped policy thinking, from the 
“big push” to the “bottom of the pyramid,” and how to measure true “human 
development.” Non-economic ideas with respect to culture and nationhood (the “idea of 
India”) also affect economic policy. The evolution, or stasis, of ideas therefore also 
matters for understanding the reform process and prospects. Individual leaders embody 
these ideas as well as representing underlying group interests, and therefore individuals 
matter in a way that is hard to capture in formal models. Keeping these issues in mind, 
the paper turns to examining specific aspects of a possible economic reform agenda for 
India, as it goes into the future. 
 
3. Governance Structures 
India has an explicitly federal governance structure, with multiple layers of elected 
governments, each with its own assignments of authority. The constitution initially laid 
out the areas of responsibility of the central and state governments, with respect to 
expenditure authority, revenue raising instruments, and legislation needed to implement 
either. Expenditure responsibilities are specified in separate Union and State Lists, with a 
Concurrent List covering areas of joint authority. Tax powers of these two levels of 
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government are specified in various individual articles. Legislative procedures for each 
level, particularly with respect to budgets and appropriations, are spelled out in detail, 
and are similar to parliamentary democracies elsewhere.  
 
As with any constitution, there is considerable leeway in terms of the actual division of 
powers between center and states, and economic reform has de facto included greater 
flexibility for the states in conducting economic policy. In some cases, such as sales tax 
breaks to attract investment to individual states, leading to a feared race to the bottom, the 
center has worked with the states as a group to jointly constrain such policies. A key 
structural feature of the constitution through its assignment of tax and expenditure 
authorities, as well as the political economy of the states’ own governance (in particular 
their failure to tax agricultural income at all), has been a vertical imbalance: the states’ 
expenditure responsibilities outstrip their fiscal capacities. The constitution made 
provisions for tax sharing, governed by quinquennial Finance Commissions. In addition, 
the central government makes transfers through various other, more discretionary 
channels. 
 
A considerable simplification of the tax sharing rules was achieved through a 
constitutional amendment in 2000, based on recommendations of the 10th Finance 
Commission (FC-X) in 1994. This affected what revenues were split between the center 
and states, though not the division among states, where the methods are largely governed 
by precedent. Based on considerations of marginal incentives for revenue-raising by 
individual states (Weingast, 1993), it has been argued (Singh and Srinivasan, 2008) that 
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changing the methodology of determining center-state transfers, as well as the assignment 
of tax authorities (reducing the states’ reliance on transfers) would improve fiscal 
performance at the state level. However, this would be a major reform that currently 
appears to be unlikely to come to the front of political agendas, despite its theoretical 
appeal. 
 
Similar issues arise with respect to local governments. Initially, local governments 
functioned entirely at the whim of their respective state governments, with little direct 
democratic representation. Constitutional amendments in 1993 changed this situation, 
giving them a more solid existence, with regular electoral mandates required. Local 
government responsibilities were also more explicitly defined. However, local 
governments remain constitutionally under the authority of the states, particularly with 
respect to revenue authority, and this has limited their effectiveness. They rely heavily on 
state-local transfers, which can be meager or uncertain. Successive Finance Commissions 
have earmarked center-state transfers for local governments (direct center-local transfers 
not being constitutionally allowed), as well as using direct central spending in areas such 
as urban development. There has been a gradual improvement in flows of funds to local 
governments, and their political functioning has become more routine.9  
 
Again, it is unlikely that major reassignments of tax authority will be undertaken. Instead, 
there is a possibility of progress in improving budgeting, accounting and other 
operational procedures of local governments. There is also scope to improve their 
incentives for own-revenue collection, particularly in the case of larger urban 
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governments. The FC-XIII report (Finance Commission, 2010, Chapter 10) provides a 
comprehensive perspective on the state of local government finances, and detailed 
recommendations for reform. 
 
Aside from the kinds of fiscal and electoral reforms discussed above, there has been little 
progress in broader governance reforms. These include reforms of parliamentary and 
legislative procedures (Kapur and Mehta, 2006), judicial reforms (Mookherjee, 2004) and 
civil service reforms (Second Administrative Reforms Commission, 2008). In each case, 
there is at least some qualitative evidence that the level of functioning of these 
institutions is below realistic feasible benchmarks. The problems include quality of 
decision-making, delays and corruption, and there are numerous specific 
recommendations that have been made for reform (e.g., Singh, 2004, 2010 and references 
therein). However, the difficulty of detailed organizational reform within the government 
is a natural consequence of the desire to protect economic rents, as discussed in the 
previous section. The difficulty is compounded by the reflexivity of the issue, when the 
reformers are the subjects of reform (Singh, 2002). 
 
Reforms in governance structures are often not perceived as part of the economic reform 
process in India. Certainly, the impetus for changing the basis for tax-sharing, or 
introducing democratically-elected local governments, did not come from the same 
conceptual source as the removal of restrictions on private industrial and trade activities. 
Nevertheless, there is a theoretical unity between these seemingly disparate policy 
reforms, which comes from the idea that behavioral incentives must be considered in 
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designing policies and institutions.10 This idea cuts across economics and politics. 
Furthermore, some of the issues of organizational reform of government in India are 
reflective of a wider worldwide reconsideration of the functioning of government, and 
not just the particularities of the Indian case. 
 
4. Taxes 
Tax assignments were alluded to in the foregoing discussion of governance structures. 
Within the existing system of assignments, there is greater room for maneuver, and 
considerable progress has been made. Again, Indian tax reform somewhat rode a global 
wave, which brought down marginal direct tax rates in the 1980s, from considerations of 
efficiency and incentives. In 1991, a committee chaired by Raja Chelliah detailed a 
comprehensive program for tax reform, and its principles have continued to guide 
subsequent policy changes.  
 
Fortuitously, the tax reform committee’s report coincided with the initial trade and 
industrial liberalization in response to the balance of payments crisis and the structural 
adjustment it triggered. Marginal tax rates on personal and corporate incomes were very 
quickly brought down by the central government, which has authority over direct taxes. 
Subsequently, aided by improvements in information technology, as well as changes in 
approach, tax administration has also improved in quality and efficiency. From a political 
economy perspective, corporations and individuals gained from the reforms, through 
greater simplicity and lower rates, while the government was able to garner increased 
direct tax revenue. Only a small group of income tax officials may have lost, through 
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reduced opportunities for corruption, though it should also be noted that the vast majority 
of the population are outside the coverage of the direct tax system – that tax base remains 
narrow. Throughout the process, the underlying legislation remained archaic, and a major 
push is now underway to create a new Direct Tax Code, which will systematize and 
refine tax reform.  
 
Greater challenges have been faced in reforming indirect taxes. Sales taxes have been the 
main revenue source for the states, but there are also various central excises and other 
levies. The indirect tax system through the 1990s was characterized by a multitude of 
rates, cascading (different taxes on top of each other), and inefficient tax competition.  It 
was well recognized that the system grossly violated economic principles of efficiency 
and equity in designing indirect taxes. Initial steps towards improving efficiency by 
adopting value added principles came earlier, in the 1980s, but only by 2005 was there a 
significant implementation of a value added tax (VAT) across the country, with 
coordination between the center and the states. The center essentially worked to provide 
an effective guarantee to the states that they would not suffer revenue losses.  
 
The VAT, by reducing cascading, reduces marginal distortions. The nature of the VAT, 
which provides an incentive for those at each stage in the value chain to honestly report 
upstream transactions (so that they are only taxed on the value added), tends to reduce 
costs of ensuring compliance. On both counts, the marginal cost of public funds is 
reduced. 
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The next major reform is the creation of a comprehensive national Goods and Services 
Tax, which is also a VAT system. The GST further broadens the tax base, improving 
efficiency and potentially allowing greater revenue capacity at a time of fiscal stress. As 
in the case of the initial VAT, information systems and administrative and organizational 
capacities have to be developed for the GST. Businesses that effectively act as tax 
collectors for indirect taxes also have to be gotten up to speed. There are bound to be 
political economy issues of how the changes will affect states’ fiscal positions, but the 
(relatively) successful introduction of the VAT system for goods has increased 
confidence that tax revenues will not be disrupted. As in the case of direct taxes, 
information technology is playing a key role in improving tax administration, and greatly 
increasing capacities for tracking and monitoring the requisite financial information 
(needed in addition to the self-compliance properties of the VAT). 
 
5. Public Service Delivery 
As measured by outcomes, public service delivery in India has fallen short of 
expectations. Basic indicators of well-being, especially various dimensions of health and 
educational attainment, are below the benchmark of low-income country averages. 
Ideally, a comprehensive approach to reform of public expenditures to promote better 
delivery of public goods and services would include structural and organizational 
changes to enhance accountability and incentives for governmental providers. There is 
some evidence (surveyed in Singh, 2007) that decentralization to electorally accountable 
local governments has improved matters. However, as noted in previous sections, lack of 
fiscal capacity at that level hampers local government effectiveness, while broader reform 
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of bureaucratic functioning has not made much progress. Many basic public goods are 
constitutionally state subjects, and the states have also tended to devote revenues to 
meeting salary obligations, or constrained revenues through generous subsidy provision. 
 
However, some states have done better than others in improving their functioning as 
providers of public goods, even without structural reforms. Rajasthan, Madhya Pradesh 
and now even Bihar, all traditionally among the worst performers in human development, 
have shown some gains. These gains can perhaps be attributed to better policy 
formulation and implementation, rather than strong national growth, since Uttar Pradesh 
has not displayed the same level of improvement. At the same time, reliance on specific 
political leaders or senior civil servants means that improvement may not be sustained, 
unless the electoral process provides a positive feedback loop.  
 
At the national level, the government has recognized that human development outcomes 
in India leave much to be desired. This recognition is perhaps not new, but has been 
given urgency by increasing inequality and evidence of social conflict as outcomes of 
rapid growth. The national government has increased spending in areas such as education 
(Sarva Shiksha Abhiyan – translated as “education for all movement,” but a government 
program) and health (the National Rural Health Mission), also trying to partially bypass 
state bureaucracies or political leaders in doing so. For example, in the NRHM, societies 
have been set up to spend central government funds, with senior bureaucrats heavily 
involved in leadership roles, but with new hybrid committees involving local 
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governments and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) as well. Thus, there is an 
attempt at organizational innovation outside the core of state government. 
 
One way of conceptualizing the national schemes and other organizational innovations is 
as part of a larger framework of public-private partnerships (PPPs). PPPs are typically 
discussed in the context of large infrastructure projects, where private partners can bring 
in expertise, financing, or both, while having superior incentives for performance, while 
the government structures partnership contracts to meet social goals that diverge from 
pure profit motives. Infrastructure, which can include public as well as private goods, is 
discussed in a subsequent section, but here one can note that PPPs for service delivery in 
areas such as health and education involve more complex partnerships of the public 
sector, for-profit private providers, and NGOs.  
 
One example of PPPs is hospitals given public land on lease, in exchange for agreeing to 
meet goals for serving low-income patients, either through direct or indirect subsidies 
(the latter through revenue-sharing and a government-managed fund for subsidies). 
Another is the empanelling of private doctors to provide institutional childbirth deliveries 
for poor patients, with the government paying. A third is government hospitals or clinics, 
with private providers being contracted for specific services, which could range from 
cleaning to high-end specializations. As is the case for governance structures, these kinds 
of innovations are part of a broader rethinking of state-market boundaries and India is in 
some ways at the frontier of experimentation.  
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From the perspective of “economic reforms,” therefore, public service delivery represents 
an important area for potential progress in the immediate future. The underlying political 
economy forces can be seen in terms of a shift from a dominance of rent-seeking 
(patronage, subsidies and transfer payments as the main role of government) to one of 
value creation, through more efficient production and distribution of public goods and 
services. In the context of democratic politics, demonstrating that the latter is a feasible 
route to electoral success may facilitate this important shift, since it provides some fruits 
of economic growth to larger numbers of voters. 
 
6. Labor Markets and Privatization 
The discussion of labor market reform in India pertains only to a very small fraction of 
the workforce, which is engaged in the so-called organized (as opposed to informal) 
sector. In fact, the small size of the organized industrial sector is partly attributed to 
restrictive labor laws. Public sector industrial enterprises, including telecoms and 
electricity firms, are also large employers in the organized sector, and this fact probably 
serves as the major political barrier to privatization, motivating the combination of these 
two issues in a single section. 
 
There is some empirical work that supports the argument that restrictive labor laws have 
had deleterious impacts on growth (Besley and Burgess, 2004), though academic opinion 
is not unanimous on the robustness of these empirical results. It is also plausible that the 
problem of lack of robust manufacturing growth in India is also due to problems with 
corporate law, land use regulations, and infrastructure, which are all discussed in later 
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sections of the paper. The Besley-Burgess analysis exploits cross-state variation as well 
as variation over time, but the translation of a complex mix of policies, enforcement and 
environment into simple indices can be tricky. 
 
Labor laws in India are designed to provide standard kinds of protections to workers in 
areas such as health and safety of working conditions, and also with respect to issues such 
as arbitrary dismissal and wage conditions. However, the formulation of legislation has 
effectively provided extreme protection for a specific subset of industrial workers in 
firms above a certain size. The problem is compounded by lack of efficient judicial 
procedures for dealing with disagreements. It is plausible that capacity expansion, 
innovation and hiring are all adversely affected by the costs of rigidity imposed by the 
current laws. 
 
With respect to public sector enterprises, the political constraints are exacerbated by 
additional protections afforded to government employees in general. Privatization (or 
disinvestment, which can mean less than full privatization) threatens job security, and 
that has been a significant factor behind opposition to privatization, though not the only 
one. Privatization can also be resisted because it reduces the power, prestige and rent-
seeking opportunities of bureaucrats and politicians. There may also be concerns about 
security, stability or the distribution of economic power that are associated with 
privatization. These issues are all recognized by policy makers (e.g., Ahluwalia, 2002), 
and are quite different from more technical economic discussions of privatization, which 
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focus on information, uncertainty and market structures (e.g., Husain and Sahay, 1992; 
Glaeser and Scheinkman, 1996). 
 
There has been little explicit progress in labor market reform. What has happened is a 
chipping away at coverage, by allowing contract workers who may not be afforded the 
same level of protection. Firms are able to retain flexibility in this manner, and several 
states have achieved “reform” by expanding the legal room for firms to use contract 
labor, without altering the core legal situation. Firms also have an incentive to use more 
skilled, salaried workers, who also will fall outside the coverage of existing laws. This is 
consistent with the observed skill-bias of India’s growth (Kochhar et al., 2006).  
 
Given the small size of the unions that represent workers who are covered by labor laws, 
the question is why reform has not been possible. Plausible factors which may come into 
play include a suspicion of business (reinforced by adversarial reactions of business to 
the unions), somewhat extreme ideals of social insurance (reinforced by the traditionally 
extreme cost of losing one’s job in a low-income, slow-growing economy with large 
amounts of surplus labor), and simply a disproportionate power of small organized 
groups such as unions (Olson, 1965). The last of these factors is almost universal across 
nations, India being somewhat of an anomaly in having created such a strong interest 
group through extreme social protection at low levels of income.  
 
Reform of labor laws may involve the evolution of alternative forms of social insurance, 
particularly unemployment insurance, a more enlightened approach by businesses, which 
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may benefit in the long run by offering pools of private insurance for workers, and 
creative approaches to legislative reform such as grandfather clauses that protect existing 
workers while allowing new hiring to be covered by different rules. This last approach is 
different from the use of contract workers, since the latter must be prevented from falling 
in or transitioning to a protected category. It is unclear whether any of this reform will be 
achieved in the short run, since it does not appear to be explicitly on the policy agenda. 
An important political economy feature here is the salient role of state governments in the 
detailed implementation of labor laws, including state-level legislations – hence reform 
will also require action at this level. State-level issues have also been important in the 
case of privatization of some firms (e.g., BALCO – see Ahluwalia, 2002), and especially 
the State Electricity Boards. 
 
7. Corporate Governance 
Traditionally, Indian business has been dominated by family firms, and by British 
corporations operating through Indian subsidiaries or managing agencies (Reed, 2002). In 
either case, corporate governance was not characterized by modern standards of 
transparency and disclosure, and contributed to the often negative perception of business 
in society at large. In some ways, there have been dramatic changes in governance 
standards, but much remains on the reform agenda.  
 
This section will not consider the special case of financial firms, nor the role of financial 
markets in influencing corporate governance in practice, since the volume contains a 
separate consideration of financial sector reform. However, it is noteworthy that the 
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recommendations of the Kumar Mangalam Birla Committee on corporate governance, 
submitted in 2000, were quickly implemented by a key additional clause (number 49) of 
the listing agreement for publicly traded companies (Chakrabarti, Megginson and Yadav, 
2008; Khanna, 2009). Hence, an important step in reforming corporate governance was 
taken by the financial market regulator, the Securities and Exchange Board of India 
(SEBI). A refinement of Clause 49 was implemented after the report of another SEBI 
committee, headed by Narayana Murthy in 2004.  
 
SEBI’s regulatory requirements went well ahead of amendments to the 1956 Companies 
Act, which had been passed in the 1990s. Hence, the legislative underpinnings of 
corporate governance remained somewhat limited. In particular, the coverage of Clause 
49 only extended to listed companies. Moreover, enforcement was weak, especially in the 
face of complex cross-holdings of family-owned conglomerates with layers of 
subsidiaries, which allowed manipulation of profits at the expense of minority 
shareholders. This is a policy concern on grounds of equity as well as efficiency and 
India’s performance in various international benchmarks of corporate governance 
remained mixed (Balasubramanian, Black and Khanna, 2008; Chakrabarti et al., 2008). 
 
The Ministry of Finance constituted committees on Corporate Audit and Governance and 
on Corporate Law (headed respectively by Naresh Chandra and J. J. Irani), which 
submitted reports in 2002 and 2005. Together with the earlier SEBI committees, these 
formed the basis of a Companies Bill, which undertakes a major overhaul of the 
Companies Act. The Bill was introduced in Parliament in 2008, but lapsed with its 
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dissolution in 2009, and was reintroduced in 2010. Meanwhile the Satyam scandal 
erupted, in which weaknesses in board practices, auditing and other facets of corporate 
governance were exposed, and the new bill adds stronger provisions. 
 
In some respects, the new legislation will reduce discretionary government control, but in 
many ways it raises standards for private companies, including accounting, disclosure, 
shareholder protections and checks and balances in governance. Specific provisions 
include new standards for composition and performance of boards of directors, as well as 
key managerial personnel. Access of shareholders to information and to voting will be 
increased, and class action suits will be allowed for the first time. Accounting and 
auditing standards will be tightened. Significantly, penalties for violations will be raised 
significantly – one of the concerns about the recent regime has been with enforcement, 
with respect to the frequency as well as severity of punishment for breaking the rules.11 
The new bill will also modernize and streamline several other provisions pertaining to 
mergers, joint ventures, and asset valuations.  
 
The relatively rapid and comprehensive reform of company law and corporate 
governance in India (assuming that the current bill passes) is in contrast to the difficulties 
of other kinds of reforms. Certainly, the reforms will not extend meaningfully to India’s 
many smaller firms, and not all the reforms will be to the liking of business owners, but 
larger firms probably see improved corporate governance as important for their global 
growth and long-run profitability. One can perhaps view the relative alignment of 
business and government in this area as a development of the system of “embedded 
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autonomy” characterized earlier by Peter Evans (1995) for South Korea.12 This provides 
a sociological perspective on business-government relations, but one can argue that the 
ultimate driver is a shift in the relative costs and benefits of rent-seeking versus value 
creation for business.  
 
8. Competition Policy 
India’s 1969 Monopolies and Restrictive Trade Practices (MRTP) Act complemented the 
extant industrial licensing regime, by placing severe limits on entry and growth, based on 
a presumption that size would lead to market dominance. With liberalization of domestic 
industry in 1991, the MRTP Act was amended the same year, to remove provisions for 
discretionary control of entry, mergers and growth. It was recognized that the legislation 
needed a complete overhaul, and this was accomplished with the passage of the 
Competition Act of 2003. 
 
The MRTP Act had been ostensibly based on international approaches to monopolies, 
anti-competitive behavior and restrictive trade practices with respect to pricing and 
exclusion. In practice, its detailed provisions and implementation made it much more 
draconian. The new act focused more explicitly on anti-competitive behavior, and 
attempted to lay the groundwork for an approach more based on economic considerations 
of efficiency. It also attempted to deal with the gap left by the 1991 amendments, 
introducing provisions for assessing anti-competitive effects of mergers. A new 
Competition Commission of India (CCI) replaced the old MRTP Commission. 
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Unusually, the new Competition Act was phased in very slowly, and its provisions were 
fully implemented only by May 2009, though a major amendment in 2007 created an 
appeals tribunal. Hence, the CCI has yet to establish itself as an entity with a clear track 
record with respect to dealing with anti-competitive behavior. The new law also did not 
give the CCI powers over retail consumer protections covered under the MRTP Act, 
which instead have devolved to consumer protection councils created by a 1986 
Consumer Protection Act (since amended several times). This act provides a much 
broader framework of consumer protection, including health and safety concerns, as well 
as quality standards and pricing practices, but seems mainly to be designed to handle 
individual consumer-initiated complaints. It also extended consumer protections to 
dealings with public sector undertakings, which might be exempt from other kinds of 
legislation against anti-competitive behavior. 
 
Given this background, the current reform agenda concerns the creation of a National 
Competition Policy (NCP). The idea of the NCP seems to have its roots in similar 
developments in countries such as Australia. However, the rhetoric in India seems to be 
somewhat broad and unfocused. In particular, competitiveness and competition are 
mingled together in discussions of the NCP (Planning Commission, 2008, Chapter 11). 
Nevertheless, there are some specific issues that arise from a more comprehensive view 
of competition policy.  
 
The 11th Plan document draws a distinction between competition law, narrowly focused 
on anti-competitive business practices, and competition policy, which provides a broader 
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framework extending across the economy. In practice, this seems to boil down to 
regulatory and legal frameworks within which private firms in regulated sectors such as 
telecommunications or power operate, as well as the conduct of public sector enterprises 
and government agencies themselves. International trade and disinvestment of public 
sector enterprises also are to be looked at from the lens of competition.  
 
National goals of creating a “level playing field” for all business enterprises, whether 
public or private, in regulated and unregulated sectors; promoting transparent, fair and 
non-discretionary regulation; and furthering competitiveness by enhancing competition 
are all appealing objectives. The real issue is how conflicting goals are to be resolved, 
and how detailed implementations will be worked out. To some extent, an NCP, perhaps 
overseen by a suggested Competition Policy Council (CPC), seems like a replacement for 
the Planning Commission and its planning exercises, reflecting an essential shift in 
philosophy with respect to economic governance that is taking place with “economic 
reform.” However, it is unlikely that such a dramatic change in the status quo would take 
place. 
 
9. Bankruptcy 
Bankruptcy law has specific practical implications for competition policy, since entry and 
exit are crucial to the dynamic efficiency of competition among firms. The Planning 
Commission’s discussion of competition policy makes a single reference to lowering 
entry and exit barriers. In fact, exit barriers have been one of the greatest weaknesses of 
India’s business environment, and India has consistently ranked at the bottom of the 
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measure of time to close a business, in the World Bank’s Ease of Doing Business 
rankings. The rules for handling insolvency, restructuring or liquidation are also a facet 
of corporate governance, and are now being addressed in the latest Companies Bill. 
However, the starkness of Indian policy’s failure to tackle exit effectively up to now 
makes it a topic of special importance. 
 
The initial attempt to deal with exit in an environment of industrial licensing and detailed 
controls over industry came with the Sick Industrial Companies Act (SICA) of 1985. In 
that environment, manufacturers found it undesirable, prohibitively costly or even 
forbidden to shut down, especially since labor laws effectively prohibited worker 
terminations. SICA attempted to provide a mechanism for winding down or reviving 
troubled companies, by referral to a Board for Industrial and Financial Reconstruction 
(BIFR). Registration with the BIFR provided temporary protection from creditors. In 
practice, there were no well-established procedures for restructuring or liquidation, and 
delays in the BIFR went from long to longer, with liquidations a ten-year process on 
average. 
 
Debt Recovery Tribunals (DRTs) were introduced in the 1990s to speed up the process of 
giving creditors relief in the face of defaulting borrowers, and the awkwardly named 
Securitisation and Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement of Security 
Interest (SARFAESI) Act, passed in 2002, gave banks the option of seizing debtors’ 
assts, or moving nonperforming assets off their balance sheets through Asset 
Reconstruction Companies. In practice, the continued existence of DRTs and other 
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appeals channels perpetuated delays in resolving disputes, and SARFAESI was of limited 
value, though banks were able to improve their balance sheets through a variety of other 
means. Meanwhile, SICA was also repealed. 
 
Ultimately, a comprehensive bankruptcy reform was needed, and it has been incorporated 
in the new Companies Bill, being considered as of this writing. Two detailed sections of 
the Bill outline a complete set of bankruptcy procedures, including restructuring and 
liquidation. Interestingly, the language clings to the philosophy of past efforts to preserve 
the status quo, linguistically treating firms as delicate organisms to be “rehabilitated”, 
“revived” or, in extreme circumstances, “wound up.” Despite this hangover from the past, 
the provisions of the new legislation represent a major and significant potential reform of 
exit policy. As necessary, they include requirements for specific new judicial tribunals, 
and go as far as to impose specific time limits on different processes and stages.  
 
Without downplaying the importance of corporate governance reforms, operating firms, 
if listed, are subject to market discipline, which can provide incentives for good 
governance beyond the scope of laws. No such thick, standardized market exists for firms 
that are in trouble. Hence, well-defined efficient procedures for exit are of supreme 
importance for creating a dynamic, competitive business environment. In this respect, the 
new bankruptcy policy represents a major leap in ideas of how Indian business should 
work, and what should be done when a business does not work. 
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10. Agriculture 
Agriculture provides well over half of India’s employment, though closer to a quarter of 
its GDP. In the long run, India has to shift labor from agriculture to manufacturing and 
services, in order to grow. Technically, this could be achieved without increases in 
agricultural productivity, if the outputs of that sector are replaced by imports. In practice, 
that is unlikely to happen, due to strategic concerns about food security. Therefore 
agricultural productivity increases will be necessary.13 
 
Soon after the initial liberalization of trade and industry, the reform agenda for 
agriculture was already well articulated (Pursell and Gulati, 1993) in parallel with 
industrial sector reforms. A case could be made for careful liberalization of international 
trade in agricultural products, bearing in mind impacts on domestic prices; liberalizing 
fertilizer imports; liberalizing procurement policies and pricing; and removing subsidies 
on water, electric power and credit. Others emphasized the importance of increasing rural 
investment generally, and in agriculture in particular. Pursell and Gulati made a case for 
deregulating food processing, and improving the targeting of the public food distribution 
system. 
 
A decade and more later, many of the same points were still being made (e.g., Ahluwalia, 
2002; Singh and Srinivasan, 2005). Singh and Srinivasan also noted the ability of states 
to restrict inter-state trade of agricultural products, and their detailed controls on 
procurement and private stock-holding. They emphasized the difficulties inherent in 
agriculture being a state subject, in the context of federal divisions of powers. To this one 
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can add that the reason this is a problem is that the current system of controls is a 
significant vestige of the former rent-seeking regime, but at the level of individual states. 
Factors which have led to some industrial dynamism and appropriate policy responses in 
industry have not had a chance to operate in agriculture, so that the political economy 
equilibrium has been relatively undisturbed. As a result, little reform has taken place in 
agriculture. An illustration comes from the contrast between Punjab and Haryana: where 
the former is completely locked into a rent-seeking equilibrium based on green revolution 
agriculture gone haywire (so that free water and power support the growth of crops that 
are both low value-added and unsuitable for that agro-climatic region), while the latter 
has been more receptive to change because of its proximity to Delhi and the rise of 
Gurgaon as an outsourcing hub. 
 
Given the barriers to reform at the state level, the national government has tried to 
increase investment in rural India, in infrastructure (Bharat Nirman, which is an umbrella 
for many infrastructure components, including water, housing and rural roads – the latter 
covered more specifically under the Pradhan Mantri Gram Sadak Yojana), health and 
education (NRHM and SSA respectively, discussed in section 5). It has also increased the 
provision of welfare payments, through efforts such as the National Rural Employment 
Guarantee Scheme. The latter efforts have had the effect of providing short-run demand 
stimuli in rural India – their long run impact on the efficiency of agriculture remains to be 
seen. Attempts to reduce input subsidies or improve the workings of institutions for 
agricultural procurement or distribution do not really seem to have made a dent, though 
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another attempt is being made, as of this writing, to reduce and rationalize fertilizer 
subsidies.  
 
The central government did form two National Commissions, on Sustainable Agriculture 
and on Farmers. These have led to a National Mission on Sustainable Agriculture and a 
National Policy for Farmers, but aside from stating goals such as creating a national 
market, and improving access to new technologies, better infrastructure and more credit, 
specific progress has been slow. It is possible that improved communication technologies 
will bring down costs of access to finance, to insurance and to markets, but often the 
problem is one of lack of basic roads and information in rural areas.  Bharat Nirman, the 
PMGSY and a National e-Governance Plan are all designed to overcome these gaps, but 
it is not clear how effective they will be in the absence of reforms of governance and 
public service delivery, as discussed in sections 3 and 5. 
 
Improvements in rural infrastructure are, in a sense, more in line with the original intent 
of India’s development strategy, rather than a part of economic reform, per se.  As noted 
earlier, reform in agriculture would include allowing markets to function more 
effectively, by delinking income support and insurance for poor farmers from policies 
that heavily distort market functioning or restrict competition. In fact, institutionally, 
rural India is still subject to the power of intermediaries that face little competition and 
have close ties to government. The political economy equilibrium at the level of 
individual states will have to change for reform of market structures to take place in any 
meaningful manner. 
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11. Land Markets 
At independence, India’s primarily agricultural economy was characterized by social and 
economic inequality. Inclusive growth at that time was conceived of as being achieved 
through policies such as land reform. Legislation was passed, but implementation was 
limited, and the distribution of rural land remained quite unequal, much more so than in 
China, for example (Bardhan, 2009a), or other East Asian economies. Land reform took a 
back seat to other agricultural policies such as input subsidies and support prices. 
 
Agricultural land markets have been relatively inoperative, because land remains a core 
rural asset, not to be given up easily. Land transfers are also made difficult by a lack of 
complete records. Computerization of land records, which makes checking existing 
records easier, has been underway for some time at the state level, supported by central 
government initiatives, but does not solve the problem of uncertain ownership or 
incomplete transfer histories. 
 
A new problem has arisen with industrial expansion and growth. Agricultural land, 
forests and mineral rights have increased in value with the potential for exploitation in 
new ways, and this has led to new conflicts. In particular, some agricultural land is 
attractive for industrial expansion. Recently an attempt to acquire land for the 
construction of a Tata automobile factory in West Bengal led to violence and deaths of 
protesting villagers. 
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The national government has attempted to create new legislation to govern the process of 
land acquisition for economic development. In the past, the government has exercised its 
rights of eminent domain for various projects, especially dams, and there have been 
problems with adequate compensation and resettlement. The involvement of the private 
sector only increases the complexity of the situation. A bill is currently (2010) before 
Parliament for consideration. It allows states to use eminent domain for 30 percent of an 
acquisition when a company has gotten agreement on 70 percent through the market, and 
shifts from judicial review to tribunals for appeals over disputes.  The goal is to achieve 
streamlining of the process while protecting existing small landowners’ rights. 
 
Many politicians are unhappy with the new proposal, as are some businesses. Bardhan 
(2009b) suggests that the procedures in the legislation will not provide adequate 
protection for small rural landholders, and proposes that firms that specialize in land 
acquisition be required to create an annuity fund, so that landowners receive a stream of 
payments over time as insurance, in addition to lump-sum transfers. He also points out 
the impact of land transfers on tenants and landless agricultural workers, and suggests 
they also be included in such annuity payments. Finally, he recommends that government 
purchases be buffered by an independent agency, to avoid political manipulation. These 
are all ways of preserving the streamlining objective, while doing more to correct the 
imbalance in bargaining power between buyers and sellers in such cases.  
 
The Bardhan suggestions are not only important for land acquisition, but also more 
generally for thinking about reform. In the context of the issues discussed in the initial 
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sections of the paper, reform creates losers as well as winners, and there need to be 
mechanisms for winners to adequately compensate losers. Furthermore, Bardhan’s 
approach addresses problems of intertemporal transfers and uncertainties. The use of trust 
funds and annuity payments is a natural mechanism for other reforms, where the less well 
off are being asked to transfer their jobs rather than land. 
 
12. Infrastructure 
Infrastructure is recognized as an area where India has lagged. Infrastructure spending 
has been lower than planned, and it has not always been clear that the capacity existed to 
implement large infrastructure projects, even with financing available. Another issue was 
the participation of the private sector in building or maintaining infrastructure that had 
earlier been the exclusive purview of the government.  
 
The past few years have seen some progress, with toll roads, a large national highway 
project, new airports in Delhi, Mumbai and Bangalore, and a metro in the capital city. 
Expertise is therefore gradually developing in project selection and management, as well 
as in structuring finances and contracts. The agenda for infrastructure investment remains 
lengthy, and includes railways and urban infrastructure as well. Investment plans for the 
railways include new logistics hubs, two new freight corridors (eastern and western) and 
a premium freight service for high value goods. Funding is being sought from the World 
Bank.  
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Urban infrastructure is receiving attention for metro-rail systems, rapid transit bus 
systems, new water infrastructure, and low income housing on the agenda for investment. 
Urbanization is seen as a major challenge, and it is planned to build capacity through new 
institutes for studying urban infrastructure project design and implementation.14 In this 
context, the development of municipal bond finance remains an important area where 
progress has been slow (Singh, 2007). 
 
The electric power sector has been one of the greatest problems for India, despite its 
importance for growth (Singh, 2006). Lack of adequate capacity and capacity expansion 
has meant that power shortages are chronic, and firms’ reliance on generators or small 
captive power plants pushes up production costs. Past reforms unbundled some 
generation, transmission and distribution, and allowed privatization and private entrants, 
but the resulting record of performance has been mixed (Bhattacharya and Patel, 2008). 
Bhattacharya and Patel outline the various reform efforts made, culminating in the 
Electricity Act of 2003, which provided guidelines for individual states to follow in their 
own reforms. As the authors show, there has been an increasing disparity across states in 
the performance of the power sector, and implementation of reform has been imperfect. 
One issue that remains unresolved is whether competition without privatization is 
sufficient for a commercially viable power sector with adequate capacity growth.  
 
More recently, in October 2009, the central Cabinet approved streamlined and relaxed 
procedures for setting up large new power plants. The US-India nuclear deal is also an 
important component of a strategy to address constraints in the power sector. Investments 
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in renewable energy sources such as solar and wind are also slated to increase, including 
foreign collaborations, but this is almost all exclusively on the drawing board. 
 
The power sector illustrates once more the political economy of Indian reforms. The 
existence of government electricity providers with large payrolls (as noted in section 6), 
and the split of responsibilities between the center and states meant that reaching 
agreement on how to allow for new private entrants was problematic. Lack of expertise in 
assessing projects and in contracting also played a role. The problems of the Dabhol 
power plant project in Maharashtra, one of the earliest new infrastructure projects, 
included perceptions of corruption and incompetence, resulting in increasing political 
barriers to subsequent projects.  
 
It has required time, successes in other infrastructure projects, and gradual managerial 
capacity building for barriers to start coming down. The finance and financial deal-
making ability for large infrastructure projects has also improved in the last decade. Of 
course, telecommunications is an area where tremendous growth has been achieved, and 
firms that have bought spectrum rights have aggressively built infrastructure for wireless 
communications. In contrast to the power sector, these private entrants did not have to 
contend too much with inefficient state incumbents, and were able to grow their market 
by offering new services to an increasing number of consumers. In other words, their 
revenue model was inherently more supportive of growth and expansion than that 
available to other kinds of infrastructure providers. 
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13. Education 
Returning to international comparisons, education has been one of the factors 
distinguishing high-performing East Asian economies from Latin America, for example 
(Birdsall, Ross and Sabot, 1995). While India’s public investments in higher education 
enabled the creation of a high-skilled upper middle class, primary education lagged 
behind. India still falls well short of universal literacy, with access to and quality of basic 
schooling leaving much to be desired. There is extensive research and documentation of 
teacher absence, low student attendance, and low levels of achievement in government 
schools. Recently, the government has legislated a right to education, and increased 
resources for primary education (in particular, through the SSA, alluded to in section 5), 
but institutional reform has been minimal, since teachers in government schools are 
effectively civil servants with no incentive to perform their jobs. There has been some 
discussion of and trials of programs like school vouchers, to give parents choice and 
thereby improve teacher incentives, but these are small experiments for now, at best. 
Private sector entry into provision of primary and secondary education has demonstrated 
latent demand, but the government has not yet succeeded in creating a model of effective 
regulation of private provision. In many respects, the education sector illustrates the 
political economy problems discussed in section 3, 5 and 6, where an existing interest 
group strives to preserve its economic rents in a highly inefficient equilibrium. 
 
Higher education has been subject to the same problems as primary and secondary 
education, with opposition from existing faculty, administrators, bureaucrats and 
politicians to changes in the incentive system, funding model or increased competition 
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from private providers, despite evidence of breakdown of the publicly funded system.15 
Nevertheless, higher education provides an opportunity for more significant reform, since 
it is not as much of a merit good as is primary education. The current system is 
dominated by government providers, and while some private colleges and universities 
have been permitted, there are uneven standards, and most of all, inadequate information 
for prospective students. After a long period of opposition to change within the Ministry 
of Human Resource Development, a reform agenda is now being articulated, which will 
increase the contribution of private providers and foreign providers of tertiary 
education.16 
 
One conceptual flaw that still creeps into policy thinking is the assumption that regulation 
needs to be in the form of detailed dos and don’ts, rather than enforcing minimum 
standards and disclosure, and allowing choice and competition to do more of the work of 
achieving efficiency. Education reform in India illustrates the limited reach that ideas 
about the proper working of markets and the role of incentives have. In this respect, the 
Chinese approach to higher education reform has been quicker and bolder. However, the 
current situation is a sea change from previous attitudes, and demonstrates that ideas do 
matter. The political leadership is now willing to apply economic principles to the 
provision of higher education, whereas earlier perspectives emphasized cultural 
nationalism and a belief that education is so special in nature that even domestic 
providers could not be trusted to provide quality.  
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In the entire post-secondary education sector, mechanisms for employer participation in 
educational design and delivery could be an important reform. For example, information 
technology firms have led the way in developing training programs for their own 
employees to make sure that skills sets are adequate and upgraded appropriately over 
time. Taking such models further, in another possible expression of embedded autonomy, 
a variety of public-private collaborations could possibly become part of higher education 
reform. 
 
14. Conclusions 
This paper has provided a rather broad overview of several areas of the Indian economy, 
where ongoing reforms are important for future growth. It has attempted to highlight 
where reforms are needed, while providing the context of past achievements. The 
conceptual underpinning of the discussion has been the idea that reform creates losers as 
well as winners, especially in a situation where the status quo involves rents for well-
defined groups in the economy. Rather than just make normative judgments on where 
reforms would have the greatest social benefits, the paper has attempted to explain the 
dynamics of past and future reforms in terms of the nature of interest groups and their 
influence.  
 
At various points, the paper also highlights the role of ideas and individuals. India 
actually has a process of debate and change implementation that is quite understandable. 
Academic ideas are often a starting point, or experiences gleaned from past mistakes or 
benchmarking against other countries. The government has a systematic process for 
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identifying important issues, setting up expert committees, and obtaining inputs from 
academics, bureaucrats, and interest groups. There are also systematic avenues for 
political bargaining – in some cases, these are supplemented by committees of politicians 
(e.g., state finance ministers) to reach agreement. The political process also has formal 
steps of legislation, formulation of new rules, and even constitutional amendments. 
 
It is also true that some recommendations of expert committees do not translate into 
action. This paper has tried to explain the difference between cases of forward progress 
and those of lack of movement in terms of different political economy equilibria. This is 
very much in the spirit of Bardhan’s (1984) classic work on the political economy of 
development in India. However, the departure here is that rather than considering the 
nation as a whole, or economic reform as a unified process, the discussion has considered 
different sectors and cases. It is at least partially possible to understand why tax reform is 
easier to accomplish than civil service reform, even though it may be technically more 
complex.  
 
Despite the wide range of topics considered, there have also been a smaller number of 
themes in the discussion of Indian economic reforms, beside the overarching one of 
political-economic equilibrium and dynamics. One is the difficulty of reforming 
governance, because of the reflexive nature of the effort required. In this context, positive 
changes in governance structures and public service delivery have proved difficult to 
achieve, though progress has not been zero.  
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Another theme is the increasing alignment of government and business, in a more 
systematic and transparent manner, as opposed to the backroom connections of the old 
discretionary control regime (though those will always persist in some form). One can 
particularly see this development in the progress being made in areas such as reforming 
corporate governance, bankruptcy provisions, and corporate policy. Even when standards 
are being raised for businesses, or regulatory requirements being added, there is a sense 
of being in it together, even if it is still not as tight a relationship as Japan, Inc. or Korea, 
Inc.  
 
A third theme is that certain areas of reform are inherently more challenging. Agriculture, 
land, labor, education and infrastructure all have special characteristics, either in terms of 
numbers, positions in the income hierarchy, complexity, expertise, or diversity of 
interests, that make progress more difficult. It is also the case that reform which involves 
reconstituting laws, regulations or governance institutions is inherently more challenging 
than liberalization or decontrol. In that sense, trade and industrial licensing were easier to 
tackle than many subsequent policy changes. In the case of monetary policy reform, the 
changes were at the level of a centralized institution and small numbers of decision 
makers, without any obvious interest group to oppose them. Financial sector reforms 
have been mixed in pace and character, but again have often been politically “easy,” with 
the modernization of the stock market being a prime example. 
 
Often, discussions of reform in India list an ideal set of reforms, but do not analyze how 
such changes may be operationalized in a politically feasible manner, where such 
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feasibility includes considerations of impacts on political support, or simply intrinsic 
social values of policy makers (in favor of fairness or equity, for example). Recognizing 
these factors and incorporating them into policy design for reforms can be more 
productive than articulating ideal end points without any pathway for reaching them. 
While time will overtake much of the specific description of the status of particular 
reforms in this piece, the analytical principles articulated here should be of more long-
lasting value. 
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Endnotes 
 
∗ This paper has been prepared for the Handbook of the Indian Economy, Oxford University Press, ed. 
Chetan Ghate. I am grateful to an anonymous referee and the editor for very helpful comments. However, I 
alone am responsible for errors, omissions and opinions expressed here. 
† Contact information: Email, boxjenk@ucsc.edu; Phone, 831-459-4093.  
1 The “big push” idea can be traced back at least to Paul Rosenstein-Rodan. Modern formulations of this 
and related ideas can be found in Murphy, Shleifer and Vishny (1989), Matsuyama (1995), Basu (1997) 
and Ray (1998). 
2 There is an ongoing debate on when “economic reform” began in India. As indicated here, there were 
reform attempts before 1991. However, these were relatively piecemeal, and were unsustainable in their 
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macroeconomic implications. The 1991 reforms marked a “big bang” effort at removing government 
controls in key areas. See Panagariya (2008) for an analysis and detailed references. Ahluwalia (2002) is 
also an important reference on the nature and pace of India’s economic reforms. 
3 The role of policies and public sector investment in creating preconditions for future growth has often 
been argued in the Indian context. A quantitative investigation that brings out the positive impacts of earlier 
policies is Sen (2007). 
4 It should be noted that these East Asian economies typically also began with import-substituting industrial 
policies not dissimilar in nature from India’s: however, for various reasons, including size and political 
economy differences, their policy paths diverged beginning in the 1960s. Several of these economies also 
differed from India in terms of their levels of social or economic inequality, and their implementation of 
policies such as agricultural land reform. I am grateful to an anonymous reviewer for reminding me of 
these points. 
5 India was one of the cases that led to the coining of the term ‘rent-seeking society’ (Krueger, 1974).  
6 In a different theoretical approach, Rodrik and Fernandez (1991) modeled ex ante individual uncertainty 
as a source of status quo bias when welfare-improving reforms are being considered. Individuals in their 
model could also be interpreted as interest groups or classes. 
7 Ahluwalia (2002) in his defense of “gradualism” in India’s reform process, effectively highlights the need 
for political consensus as shaping the pace and sequence of reforms. There is also a related literature on 
sequencing of reforms, beginning at least with Little, Scitovsky and Scott (1970), and reviewed in Edwards 
(1990), which includes political economy considerations driven by adjustment costs and uncertainties. This 
literature focuses on the sequence of trade reform, domestic financial reform, and financial openness. 
India’s approach to these has adhered quite well to the analytical prescriptions of the literature. In any case, 
these areas are outside this chapter’s scope. 
8 This parallel should only be interpreted in the broadest possible terms, with respect to the relative role of 
markets and the state. The details of China’s political economy and its reform process differ substantially 
from India. It is beyond the scope of this paper to make a comparison, but a brief discussion is provided in 
Singh (2007a). 
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9 Singh (2007) provides a detailed review and assessment of the evidence on the progress and impacts of 
this decentralization process in India. 
10 This point can be illustrated with a quote from Basu (2010), in the context of food grain management 
policy, “It would be wonderful if people were innately honest and self-monitored their behavior; and 
government ought to educate the citizenry to develop these qualities. But to assume that they have these 
qualities when they do not is to risk designing a flawed mechanism that will be pilfered and adulterated, as 
indeed happens widely in our food distribution system.” 
11 Judicial delays also are a barrier to enforcement, since delays reduce the effective penalty, even when it 
is eventually imposed (Singh, 2004; Khanna, 2009). 
12 The promotion of the Finance Ministry’s Department of Corporate Affairs to an independent ministry 
can be viewed as a manifestation of this development on the government side. The idea is that embedded 
autonomy leads to more cooperatively determined “rules of the game.” In contrast, the old regime began 
with adversarial rules, which made room for ex post, inefficient cooperation through collusive rent-seeking. 
13 Of course, there are linkages from agricultural growth to growth in the rest of the economy, through 
demand channels for final and intermediate goods (Kalirajan and Sankar, 2001), as well as distributional 
concerns and transition costs if agriculture were to shrink rapidly. 
14 Rural infrastructure represents a different category, and has been treated along with agriculture in section 
10. Essential differences include density and scale, the former being greater and the latter smaller in rural 
infrastructure versus national-level or urban infrastructure.  
15 A more pessimistic analysis, which emphasizes the distortion of the ideas as well as the institutions 
governing higher education, is in Kapur and Mehta (2008). 
16 Aside from the need to greatly expand the capacity of degree-awarding colleges and universities, India 
also has a strong need to increase the quality and quantity of post-secondary vocational training. 
Government-run institutes are underfunded and poorly run. The government has been increasing spending 
allocations for such institutes, but fundamental problems of incentives in service delivery remain. 
